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On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow 
Wilson delivered his famous fourteen points 
to a joint session of Congress setting out his 
plans for peace and reform of a world broken 
by war. The United States had entered the 
conflict the previous April as an ‘Associate’ 
power and now the president was keen to 
set out his nation’s blueprint that he hoped 
would define the terms of the coming peace 
negotiations. For Wilson, it was evident 
that the current system of world order had 
allowed small conflicts to spiral out of control 
with devastating results. He saw an epochal 
struggle between the forces of the past and 
future. A new order based both in idealism 
and practical politics would be necessary to 
replace the old system of imperialism and 
balance of power if humanity was ever to 
avoid a repeat of the tragic war. The ideas 
Wilson put forward that January day were not 
new, indeed only a few days previously, the 
British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had 
expressed many of the same ideas on lasting 
peace, self-determination, arms limitation 
and a league of nations in his speech at 
Caxton Hall. Nevertheless, posterity far 
better recalls Wilson’s speech. Timing and 
specificity to the problems at hand, not 
novelty, gave it immediate significance. Yet 
the Fourteen Points have reverberated in the 
years since as a key moment in the history of 
United States internationalism and the birth 
of a Wilsonian foreign policy tradition. 
and his family expected him to follow them 
into the ministry. Whilst he did not quite 
have a messiah complex, he was convinced 
that he, and the United States, were working 
out God’s plan on earth. A belief evident in 
the detached, morally superior attitude he 
adopted towards the war in Europe and the 
belligerents.
As it happened, Wilson chose a different 
path by completing his PhD in History 
and Political Science and then pursuing 
an academic career that saw him rise to be 
president of Princeton. After a number of 
internal academic battles and frustrations at 
the institution, Wilson felt called to enter 
the world he had only written about as a 
Democratic politician. After a brief stint as a 
reforming Governor of New Jersey in 1910, 
his meteoric political rise continued when he 
won the 1912 presidential election against a 
badly divided Republican Party. The Wilson 
who entered the White House in 1913 was 
an enigmatic, intellectual man who would 
rather focus on domestic policy and once 
even said ‘it would be an irony of fate’ if 
his administration dealt chiefly with foreign 
affairs. Such was the fate that also befell 
the other two great reforming Democratic 
presidents of the twentieth century, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and Lyndon D. Johnson.
Wilson expressed his inner idealism during 
the early years of his administration. In 
a speech at Mobile, Alabama in October 
1913, he had renounced further overt US 
imperialism (that his predecessor Theodore 
Roosevelt had been so keen on).(1) He also 
famously sought to teach the Mexicans 
to ‘elect good men’ in 1916 and had even 
talked about a ‘league of nations’ in the 
abstract many times (both as a domestic idea, 
a hemispheric idea with the Pan American 
League and as a source of European peace at 
the suggestion of British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Edward Grey). All struck a chord with 
his support among domestic progressives 
and the political left in the US and reached 
its apotheosis in his ‘peace without victory’ 
speech of 22 January 1917 with its critique 
of European imperialism, militarism and 
balance of power politics and his call to make 
the world ‘safe for democracy’ in April of the 
same year.(2) The transition to war for the 
US in 1917 only heightened the need for 
a statement of some kind on war aims and 
this increased as the year progressed. The 
US had entered the war as an ‘Associate’ 
power to avoid long-standing European 
Great Power tensions and unlink the war 
from nationalistic disputes and ambitions. 
Only a unilateral declaration of aims would 
differentiate the US from allied nations. 
As the war in Europe dragged on, there 
was a decline in allied morale and so a clear 
statement of American aims might serve to 
bolster their nerve and undermine German 
support for the war. More particularly, there 
was despondency towards the war among 
the political left in the US and Europe 
following the fall of Russian government 
to the Bolsheviks in November 1917 and 
the subsequent disclosure of secret allied 
treaties that illuminated questionable Allied 
diplomatic practices. The Sykes-Picot of 
16 May 1916 had aimed to divide-up 
southwestern Asia among the Allies. The 
Treaty of London 26 April 1915 between 
Triple Entente and Italy promised large 
swathes of territory to the north of Italy and 
across Adriatic along with funding from the 
British in return for Italy joining the war. 
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President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 (Library of 
Congress).
It is difficult to discuss Wilson’s speech 
without first saying a little about the twenty-
eighth president who held office from 1913 
to 1921. He was born in Staunton, Virginia 
in 1856 and so was a southerner with all 
that entailed for his racial beliefs. Perhaps his 
first defining memories were of the defeated 
Confederate soldiers returning from the Civil 
War and the great ‘lost cause.’ He was also a 
deeply religious and moral man. His father 
and grandfather were Presbyterian ministers 
President Wilson requests a declaration of war from Congress, 2 April 1917 (Library of Congress)
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While the Constantinople Agreement of 
18 March 1915 promised Constantinople 
and Dardanelles to Russia in the event of an 
Allied victory. A firm statement of ideals and 
moral direction by the US president might 
therefore rally a disenchanted political left 
back to the cause.
The Bolshevik revolution in Russia also 
provided a more direct stimulation for 
Wilson to make a statement of war aims. 
The US and the Allies needed a persuasive 
response to the Bolshevik’s charges that 
both sides were sacrificing their people to 
capitalism and imperialism in a seemingly 
unstoppable carnage. Lenin’s ‘Decree on 
Peace’ of 8 November 1917 proposed an 
immediate Russian withdrawal from the war 
threatening to undermine the Allied war 
effort. A statement of aims by Wilson might 
therefore counteract this and keep Russia in 
the war by convincing Bolsheviks they would 
receive a much better peace from Allies.
It was against this background that 
Wilson’s speech of 8 January 1918 set out 
suggested guidelines for both a practical 
settlement of territorial questions in Europe 
and Middle East and his idealistic principles 
for maintaining world peace in the future. 
Practical Politics
Despite Wilson’s reputation for idealism, it 
is surprising that some eight of his fourteen 
points actually deal with specific territorial 
disputes. The complex arguments of Europe 
over land meant that Wilson had no choice 
but to practice a degree of power politics. 
To guide him, Wilson set up a team of 150 
advisers known as ‘the Inquiry’ in September 
1917, led by his close political aide Colonel 
Edward M. House. Their job was to 
anticipate the questions that would arise at 
the peace conference. House was a ‘southern 
Colonel’ from Texas with no military service 
but a good deal of experience as an influential 
state politician who had hitched a ride on 
Wilson’s rising political star and helped shape 
his presidency. [Photo 3 Here] The Inquiry 
was stuffed full of other eminent intellectual 
talent such as Walter Lippmann (later famous 
as a journalist and commentator) Isiah 
Bowmen, Sidney Mezes and David Hunter 
Miller to help advise on a broad range of 
issues. As a mark of its importance to Wilson, 
twenty-one of the Inquiry went on to join 
the American Commission that travelled to 
Paris with the President in 1919. 
Wilson tasked the Inquiry to look at 
Allied intentions, including the recently 
exposed secret treaties, and sort out what 
the Americans could support in the peace 
to remove the poison from the entangled 
situation and what would be intolerable 
for them. The eventual 2000 reports and 
over 1200 maps generated by the Inquiry 
eventually boiled down to eight points in 
Wilson’s final speech.
Idealism
Intervention in the war transformed Wilson’s 
idealism into a war aim because he took 
many of his domestic progressive policies 
and translated them into an approach to 
international relations. The first five and 
fourteenth point were therefore the beating 
heart of his proposals. The Europeans, 
Prime Ministers Georges Clemenceau, David 
Lloyd George and Vittorio Orlando were 
sceptical of his approach. Wilson made his 
speech without any prior consultation of the 
Allies and Clemenceau famously scoffed on 
reading the Fourteen Points that the ‘Good 
Lord had only ten!’ [Photo 4 Here]
Wilson struck at what he saw as the 
systemic causes of the present war and, 
by implication, at much of what the Allies 
accepted as international diplomacy. Point 
I on open covenants was a clear stab at the 
secret treaties of the Allies that had been so 
controversial. Point II covering freedom of 
the seas took a swipe at the British blockade 
that had been their major war strategy to 
starve Germany to defeat. Some historians 
have seen Point III’s call for the removal of 
economic barriers as a sinister dark side to 
Wilson’s internationalism. They argue for an 
economically driven policy to increasingly 
dominate and control access to markets 
and raw materials in the world economy.(4) 
Point IV’s disarmament appeared an obvious 
route to peace through the avoidance of 
the dangerous arms races that had occurred 
prior to the war. 
Point V’s call for self-determination of 
peoples would ultimately prove one of the 
two key pillars of a Wilsonian worldview in 
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions 
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other 
nations…This was a direct appeal to Soviet Russia and attempt to keep them in 
the war. 
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without 
any attempt to limit the sovereignty. The original reason Britain had gone to war 
and a red line for the Allies.
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the 
wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine. 
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality. 
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary…should be accorded the freest opportunity to 
autonomous development. 
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories 
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea;
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development… 
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be 
assured a free and secure access to the sea.(3)
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no 
private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed 
always frankly and in the public view
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike 
in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by 
international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment 
of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace 
and associating themselves for its maintenance. 
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced 
to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined. 
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike.(5)
Wilson’s close advisor, Colonel Edward M. House 
(Library of Congress)
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the years to come. Peoples allowed to choose 
their own destiny would operate a democratic 
control on autocracy by never consenting to 
their leaders spending blood and treasure on 
wars with other democratic nations. While 
the intended result would be a more peaceful 
world, Wilson clearly only meant it to refer 
to European nations. This was no wider 
anti-imperial scheme in Wilson’s mind at 
this time and he famously refused to grant 
a young Ho Chi Minh an audience after he 
travelled to Versailles to plead Indochina’s 
case to the inspiring American president. 
Point XIV provides the other famous pillar of 
the Wilsonian outlook. A collective security 
organisation via the League of Nations would 
bring an end to balance of power diplomacy 
and spheres of influence. Nations would 
instead pool their sovereignty (though Wilson 
never fully specified how) in a transnational 
organisation to guarantee and protect 
everything else detailed in the speech.
Legacy of the Fourteen Points
With hindsight, we know Wilson’s idealistic 
scheme was doomed to failure. By mid-
1918 Allied leaders were girding up to 
fight their corner in the coming diplomatic 
struggles while in the US, isolationist and 
nationalist opposition to Wilson’s scheme 
was growing. Colonel House worked hard 
to get the recalcitrant Allied leaders to accept 
the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace 
negotiations. France and Italy did so finally 
on 1 November 1918 while Britain eventually 
signed off on them all except on freedom of 
the seas. Wilson realised the limitations of his 
power over the Allies now looking to protect 
their own positions and guarantee their 
future security. He was therefore prepared to 
sacrifice much of what he had set out in his 
Fourteen Points in diplomatic horse-trading 
to secure the project dearest to his heart, the 
League of Nations.
The eventual Treaty of Versailles placed 
war guilt squarely with the Germans in 
Article 231. It also initially called for 269 
billion marks of reparations eventually 
reduced to 192 billion in 1921. A decision 
John Maynard Keynes famously damned 
in his book The Economic Consequences of 
the Peace for virtually guaranteeing another 
European war. The Treaty also further 
limited Germany by denying them an air force 
and limiting their army to 100,000 men. 
Attempts to resolve the intractable territorial 
disputes with Polish corridors, demilitarised 
zones on the French borders and even the 
creation of states such as Czechoslovakia 
failed to solve the deep-seated territorial 
tensions permanently. The victorious Allies 
also shared out the colonies of the defeated 
powers under the euphemism of ‘mandates’ 
in trust for the League of Nations. The 
Europeans had clearly sidestepped Wilson’s 
notion of ‘peace without victory’ and to 
some had duped a naïve Wilson.
Much to Wilson’s regret, the US did 
not join the League of Nations and so his 
grand scheme never received its keystone. 
Isolationist and political opposition 
coalesced around the Republican Chair of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Henry Cabot Lodge who made it his 
personal mission to halt Wilson’s idealism. 
The President’s unwillingness to broker a 
deal and, some argue, his poor health also 
contributed to the defeat. US membership of 
the League came up twice for consideration 
by American legislators who dismissed it in 
November 1919 and again in March 1920. 
By that time, Wilson had suffered a collapse 
and serious stroke and he remained a distant 
and detached invalided figure in the White 
House until he left office the following year.
Wilson’s scheme set out in his speech of 
January 1918 did not die. It survived in 
modified form after a revival by Franklin 
Roosevelt in the 1940s with the United 
Nations (though with a Security Council 
with five permanent members as a concession 
to balance of power diplomacy). Historians 
have since traced many strands of what they 
call a ‘Wilsonian’ foreign policy emanating 
from the US.(6) In a string of interventions 
since World War II, from Vietnam to 
Afghanistan, Americans have used a language 
of idealism rather than pragmatism to justify 
their involvement in the world. One hundred 
years from its first promulgation, the visible 
hand of Wilson is still there to varying degrees 
in claims to be defending self-determination 
and democracy in a pluralistic world that still 
refuses to conform to American ideals.
Graham Cross
Lecturer in American History, Manchester 
Metropolitan University
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